Английски език
The perception among many officers of all ranks in the U.S. armed services is that casualty aversion limits the military's ability to perform its mission. A frequent remark from military members during discussions of world crisis spots and what the U.S. response should be is that if the military suffers a single casualty, the mission will be ended because the American people will not support such intervention with casualties. Yet this is a myth that has so permeated the U.S. military today as to have the effect of limiting risk taking in military operations. Limiting risk in the name of casualty aversion carries the future implication of driving boldness out of the military organizations. The unforeseen consequence may be more casualties in the next conflict. The origins of casualty aversion are explored using three criteria applied to the three case studies of the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, and the intervention in Somalia. First, public opinion polls are used to identify the changing nature of public opinion in support of each of the case studies. The research also includes data on the effect of media coverage of military operations as it relates to public opinion and support. Second, the nature of U.S. warfighting capability is chronicled through the case studies using historical documents and books to determine if the ability of the U.S. military today, through technology, has become so thorough and efficient as to induce a feeling in decision-makers that war can be waged without friendly casualties. Finally, an examination is made of decision-makers, both in the highest echelons of the military and their civilian counterparts, and whether an aversion to casualties has evolved over the years among this group. The research determines whether or not there is a myth that has led senior civilian and military leaders to believe the U.S. should only commit forces when friendly casualties can be minimized. Research reveals that the American public is remarkab
