Английски език
The operationalization of Military Deception (MILDEC) requires a unique combination of resources, detailed intelligence, significant preparation, operational security and secrecy to achieve maximum effects. It requires close synchronization horizontally and vertically through staffs regardless of echelon, while controlling the dissemination of information to maintain secrecy. Unfortunately, this has been lost in the process of deconstructing operational staffs and reorganizing them to manage complexity, and gain perceived efficacies by the decentralization of battle command functions. This monograph provides historical case studies and a doctrinal review of operational deception that provides a basis from which to evaluate theories of complexity and organizational design to provide recommendations for the organization of a special staff section to conduct MILDEC. Two case studies from British and Soviet experiences during the Second World War (WWII) are used to assess the development and organization of General Staffs to conduct operational deception. WWII left both forces with a vast reservoir of experience concerning the battle command of operational deception. Despite their historical and cultural differences, both concluded WWII with similar lessons concerning the necessity of centralized control of deceptive tasks, the management of information, and the criticality of maintaining essential secrecy, and operational security. The applicability of these lessons to contemporary conflicts is addressed by contrasting two simple models of regular and irregular warfare. It is possible to assert that MILDEC has the capability to provide supporting and decisive effects in support of operational objectives regardless of the form, level, or complexity of warfare experienced. Some theorists such as Alberts and Bar-Yam propose that as the complexity of our operational environments increase so must the complexity of our organizations. Hierarchical organizations become less e
