Английски език
This monograph discusses the intricacies of liquidating tactical encirclements and bypassed pockets of enemy resistance. Operational employment of U.S. Army doctrine will lead to tactical encirclements in most instances. Contemporary doctrine, however, fails to acknowledge the probability of encirclement. Additionally, doctrine fails to address methods of dealing with enemy pockets. History argues that encircled enemy units often refuse to capitulate and usually require reduction by force. Furthermore, four brief examples of encirclement from the Russo-German front of World War II demonstrate that reduction operations are often difficult and complex. An encircling commander must foresee the consequences of encirclements and attempt to create the most favorable conditions for the reduction of encircled enemy forces. He must select a method and technique of reduction. He must base his selection on the situation, the threat posed by the enemy, the requirement for speed, the available resources, and the likely costs. Regardless of the method and technique chosen, the encircling commander must also consider the following: pausing to organize, establishing maneuver and fire control measures, isolating the enemy, nuclear weapon employment, and psychological operations. This paper concludes that the Army must acknowledge its doctrinal void, research and develop a reduction methodology, and amend its doctrine.
