Called by the ‘Baby Blitz’ by the British, Operation Steinbock was the Luftwaffe's last major air offensive against the UK launched between January and May 1944. Led by Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz, the operation sought to strike London and other English cities, the target list including places such as Bristol, Hull, and Portsmouth. Despite its ambitious goals, Steinbock was poorly timed and ill executed. By 1944, the Luftwaffe’s bomber force was a shadow of its former self: it faced severe shortages of trained aircrew, fuel, and modern aircraft, while British radar, night-fighter defences, and anti-aircraft coordination had become highly sophisticated and effective. A number of Luftwaffe types were used in the attacks, from the four-engine Heinkel He 177A, through to Junkers Ju 188s, Dornier Do 217s, Junkers Ju 88s, Messerschmitt Me 410s and Focke-Wulf Fw 190s. The raiders’ losses were catastrophic – over 500 aircraft were destroyed or damaged, draining the Luftwaffe of irreplaceable aircrew. This amounted to 63% of the German aircraft committed to Operation Steinbock, at an average rate of 77 aircraft lost each month. Such losses almost bled the German bomber arm dry. Peltz himself summed up the campaign thus after the war: ‘The attacks on London and other British cities were, in my opinion, like a few drops of water on a hot stone – a bit of commotion, but after a very short time the whole thing was forgotten.’Indeed, the raids inflicted limited damage compared to the Blitz of 1940–41. Despite the fact that some 1,556 people were killed, they had negligible impact on British morale or industry. Operation Steinbock marked the Luftwaffe’s last sustained large-scale strategic night bombing campaign against the United Kingdom in the Second World War. In this book, the renowned Luftwaffe historian Chris Goss not only details how the campaign developed, but also the RAF’s and Allies’ response. As the author reveals, Steinbock demonstrated the Third Reich’s declining air power and the growing futility of offensive operations under Allied air superiority. The operation’s failure further weakened the Luftwaffe’s ability to resist the Allied air offensive that would soon precede the D-Day invasion.
