Английски език
This monograph examines truth in fiction from the point of view of a naturalized logic. It argues that propositions unambiguously true and false together aren't always contradictions. The author uses examples from literary fiction to fully illustrate his point. He structures his argument around two focal questions. What would it take to write a book about truth in literary discourse with reasonable promise of getting fiction right? What would it take to write a book about fiction that was as true to the facts of lived literary experience as objectivity allows? The overall answer is that the logic of fiction needs a new way. The author abandons many of the standard analytical tools and philosophical assumptions. The idea he presents is a theory that has the look of a dialethic logic, but isn't one in fact. It is a theory in which the true sentences of fiction are also concurrently and unambiguously false, and known to be so by readers who know it without the slightest trace of cognitive dissonance. Readers will learn a naturalized causal response epistemology, attended by a naturalized logic. One that is data-driven, empirically sensitive, and open to circumspect collaboration with the empirical sciences of cognition.
