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Understanding Consciousness

Its Function and Brain Processes

Автор: Gerd Sommerhoff

Език:

Корици: С меки корици

Издател: SAGE Publications Inc

Наличност: Външен склад

Изпращаме след 14-20 дни

43.47 € 85.03 лв

'This is surely the ultimate expression of the top-down approach to consciousness, written with Somm...

Информация за книгата

Автор

Gerd Sommerhoff

Език

Английски език

Корици

Книга - С меки корици

Издадена

2000

страници

208

EAN

9780761967750

ISBN

0761967753

Enbook ID

04686370

Издател

SAGE Publications Inc

Теглоt

320

Размери

156 x 234 x 11

Пълно описание

'This is surely the ultimate expression of the top-down approach to consciousness, written with Sommerhoff's characteristic clarity and precision. It says far more than other books four times the size of this admirably concise volume. This book is destined to become a pillar of the subject' -Rodney Cotterill, Technical University of Denmark The problem of consciousness has been described as a mystery about which we are still in a terrible muddle and in Understanding Consciousness: Its Function and Brain Processes, the author unravels this mystery through a clarification of the main concepts related to consciousness, followed by a comprehensive biological explanation. Consequently, this book will be ideal for a wide-range of upper-level undergraduate and postgraduate courses. The author interprets consciousness as a property that can also be possessed by creatures lacking a language faculty and comprises all of the following: awareness of the surrounding world; awareness of the self as an entity; and awareness of such things as thoughts and feelings.He argues that a biological approach can achieve both the necessary conceptual clarifications and a joint explanation of these divisions of awareness in terms of just two accurately defined concepts of 'internal representation' and two empirically supported assumptions about the functional architecture of a specific set of brain processes. Despite this striking simplicity, his model covers these divisions of awareness, both as objective faculties of the brain and as subjective experience. These conclusions are applied to a broad range of fundamental questions, including the biological rationale of subjective experience and where consciousness resides in the neural networks.